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This dissertation aims to analyze the correlation between overconfidence and political 
ideologies. Because we live in the European Union that is facing social and economic 
disintegrations as well as new challenges, it’s more usual to see the arising of more extreme, 
radical political ideologies. In this paper it is studied, based on previous literature, how 
conservatives/right-wing parties might display higher amounts of overconfidence bias than 
liberals/left-wing parties. With the assistance of an online survey, overconfidence is tested not 
only in financial literacy but also in decision making. Subjective and Objective Knowledge are 
also analyzed independently so that it is possible to correlate both overconfidence and political 
ideologies. Regression Models are also used. It was confirmed that it’s not possible to correlate 
objective knowledge and political ideology, however it wasn’t possible to confirm that 
conservatives do display higher amounts of overconfidence than liberals. It was concluded that 
political ideology might not be a good estimator for overconfidence. 
Keywords: Overconfidence, Political Ideology, Financial Literacy, Decision Making, 
Subjective Knowledge, Objective Knowledge. 
 
Resumo 
Esta dissertação procura analisar a correlação entre ideologias políticas e o excesso de 
confiança. Porque atualmente vivemos na União Europeia que sofre com uma desintegração 
social e económica, e novos desafios, é frequente ver a ascensão de partidos e ideologias mais 
extremistas e radicais. Nesta dissertação é estudado como Conservadores/ Defensores de 
partidos de Extrema Direita cometem mais o erro de excesso de confiança do que os 
Liberais/Defensores de partidos de Extrema Esquerda, algo já defendido anteriormente noutros 
estudos científicos. Com o auxílio de um questionário realizado online, o excesso de confiança 
é testado no conhecimento financeiro, assim como na tomada de decisão de cada indivíduo. 
Conhecimento Subjetivo e Objetivo são também analisados independentemente, de forma a ser 
possível correlacionar o excesso de confiança com as diferentes ideologias políticas. Modelos 
de Regressão Linear são também usados. Foi confirmado que não é possível correlacionar 
conhecimento objetivo com ideologias políticas, no entanto, não foi possível confirmar que 
pessoas mais conservadoras demonstram maiores níveis de excesso de confiança do que 
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liberais. Foi concluído que ideologias políticas não são o melhor estimador para prever o 
excesso de confiança de um individuo.  
Palavras-Chave: Excesso de confiança, ideologias políticas, conhecimento financeiro, tomada 
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The financial crisis of 2008 that affected the entire world ended up dividing European Union in 
two (Palier, Rovny & Rovny,2018): the first part, composed by the center and north of Europe, 
focused around Germany has consistently risen up out of the crisis and continued a steady yet 
slow monetary and social way. The second group gathering predominantly southern and eastern 
European nations remains stuck in negative monetary and social circumstances following the 
crisis. But this disengagement is not happening  only due to  economic reasons : the thousands 
of  refugees that are coming from countries like Syria and Afghanistan and are dividing 
countries regarding whether Europe should help them or not;  the continuous attempt of one of 
European’s main motor, Great Britain, to leave Europe for good, as well as the constant fight 
to keep the Euro coin alive has been weakening and discrediting the European Union as we 
know (Woods, 2016). In fact, this loose of faith has been showed by the change in political 
ideologies that are being represented in the European Union. Since the 2014 EU parliament 
elections, the number of parties that are anti-Euro and/or anti-Europe have been increasing 
consistently: The extreme right parties have been gaining coverage in countries like France 
(National Front with Marine Le Pen), Austria (FPÖ and ÖVP coalition), Hungary (Fidesz), 
amongst others. In fact, in the beginning of 2019 an article made by the Portuguese magazine 
Visão (Europeias: Direita nacionalista governa em dez países da UE., 2019) stated that only 
Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, United Kingdom and Romania didn’t have a 
conservative/Extreme right-wing party in their parliament, nor represented in the European 
Parliament. Yet, since October 2019 this situation already changed with the entry of the political 
party “Chega” in the Portuguese parliament.   This is not totally unexpected as it was already 
proved that after periods of uncertainty and fear, the right -wing parties gain more power and 
importance (Allen, 2015). 
However, what does this mean to the future of our economy and society as we live in? Should 
we be prepared for some potential flaws that right-wing parties are keener to make? And if yes, 










Overconfidence has been one of the most popular, consistent and common bias made by the 
human being (Johnson & Fowler, 2011; Moore & Healy, 2008). In fact, Plous in his book “The 
Psychology of judgement and decision making” 2003, already stated that “No problem in 
judgment and decision making is more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than 
overconfidence” (page 217). It is believed that overconfidence can be accountable for some 
part of why business people who have more confidence tend to pursuit more entrepreneurial 
ideas, even though it is known how low the rate of success of a startup is (Camerer & Lovallo, 
1999; Koellinger, Minniti & Schade, 2007). Overconfident CEOs also tend to disregard more 
corrective feedback than less confident ones (Chen, Crossland & Luo, 2015), and financial 
crisis were more harshly felt in banks   managed by overconfident CEOs (Ho, Huang, Lin & 
Yen, 2016). This last study also showed how overconfident CEOs are bigger risk-takers and 
how this was correlated with higher expected default probability of banking institutions in 
different financial crisis from 1999 to 2009. To all intents and purposes, overconfidence is 
extremely analyzed in Financial studies, where scientists have created hypothetical models to 
dissect the involvement of overconfidence on financial markets (Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005).  
Another important example of the consequences of this bias are wars, since it was already 
proven that decision makers that are more confident tend to engage more in conflicts and riskier 
decisions (Johnson & Tierney, 2011). Accidents like Fukushima and Chernobyl could also had 
been avoided if there were less faith concerning the efficiency of the nuclear power plants (Song 
& Kim, 2014). 
However, overconfidence is also responsible for having a positive impact on people. It was 
already proven that people who display higher amounts of confidence and positivism are 
mentally happier, more proactive in the daily life and healthier (Taylor & Brown, 1994). The 
extra dose of conviction can also help someone take that extra step in more challenging projects 
as well as not giving up so easily, which might, sometimes, be extremely beneficial in 
someone’s life. (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002).  
But what is in fact the overconfidence bias? Overconfidence can be defined as “the tendency 
of individuals to overestimate their abilities” (Hill, Kern, & White, 2012 – page 188). 
Overconfidence started being discussed in the early sixties (Muthukrishna, Heine, Toyakawa, 
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Hamamura, Kameda  & Henrich, 2014) and since then, a lot of different attributions have been 
made in order to better understand this bias, however, there’s still a lot of confusion regarding 
the different terminology used to define it ( Chen, Crossland, & Luo, 2015) .In order to simplify 
our research it is going to be followed  the work  done by Moore and Healy (2008) where it was 
distinguished three main types of overconfidence: 
1. Over-estimation, like the own name says, it is the overestimation of one’s current capability, 
by thinking that they are better than they actually are. For example, one person might 
overestimate the time needed to complete a certain task, by thinking that they are going to 
be more efficient than they really are. (Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 1994); 
2. Over-placement, when one might think that they’re superior to the average person in 
completing a certain task and/or having some type of knowledge. For example, one 
individual might believe he/she is better at choosing a career, comparing to others, 
disregarding the fact that they will be in a group that will also have the same over-placement 
type of thinking (Windschitl, Rose, Stalkfleet & Smith, 2008). 
3. Over-precision, when someone is too sure that they are accurate on their 
results/decisions/beliefs. One study made by Highhouse, 2008, already proved that 
managers tend to believe that they are more accurate at collecting relevant information from 
interviews than they actually are.  
 
In this study we’re going to focus on the over-precision bias, for the reason that this one is 
considered to be the most persistent one, sometimes even diminishing the effect of the other 
two (Moore & Healy, 2008) as well as over-estimation. Because this particular study will 
include an online survey, we won’t analyze the effect of over-placement, since the participant 
is totally unaware of the remaining participants and for that reason it won’t have the possibility 
to compare its result with others.   
Overconfidence can be caused by two main factors: motivational and cognitive factors 
(Muthukrishna, Heine, Toyakawa, Hamamura, Kameda & Henrich, 2014). It can be 
motivational when an idea is distorted consciously or unconsciously to defend the self-interest 
or to succumb to peer pressures (Montibeller & Von Winterfeldt, 2015), whereas it can be 
cognitive when there’s a defective mental process that disrespects some principles that are 
universally accepted (Montibeller & Von Winterfeldt, 2015). Both factors can translate in a 
faulty bias and for that reason should be evaluated with the same degree of seriousness.  
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Overconfidence bias should be carefully analyzed as it is considered by some as “the mother of 
all biases” (unknown): when you are extremely confident, it might lead you to fall into other 
biases in decision making without even noticing it. It is therefore extremely difficult for people 
to be aware that they are committing this type of bias.  People have difficulty to measure 
accurately its own knowledge and ability regarding some issue, (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002), and 
they are even worse to collect relevant data about others (Moore & Healy 2008). For that reason, 
it is very tempting for people to overestimate their own abilities and to be overconfident. Moore 
& Healy also proved that on difficult tasks, overestimation (thinking you are better than you 
actually are) is on average more likely to happen, whereas in easiest tasks, over-placement 
(thinking you are better than others) takes place more often. 
It was already demonstrated how overconfidence might vary according to age (Hansson, 
Rönnlund, Juslin & Nilsson, 2008), gender and race (Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2012), population 
(Stankov & Lee, 2014), among other issues, including politics (Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2015).  
 
Political Ideology  
Politics is a concept that was created by Aristotles in Greece with its first of 8 books that were 
written between 335–323 BCE (Miller, 1998; De Vries, 2007). This famous word represents 
the different concepts of governance in a country that might exist, and it is logical the natural 
creation of political parties to represent a group that share the same social, economic and human 
ideologies.  
There has been a recharged enthusiasm for the idea of political belief system (Jost, Federico & 
Napier, 2009) and studies already showed how discussing politics enhances the creation of 
broader and informative opinions regarding public affairs, as well as it increases the tolerance 
between different parties (Mutz, 2002; Searing, Solt, Conover & Crewe 2007). It is therefore 
crucial that different political ideologies can be recognized and discussed freely, as they 
represent the public’s opinion and principles, and also because rare political exchange can breed 
a culture of resignation and intolerance, particularly if dialog has a deficit of diversity (Gibson, 
1992). 
Political ideologies’ spectrum is divided between two main groups: Left/Right wing and 
Liberal/Conservative. The first group appeared after the French Revolution (1789-1799), where 
in the Assembly people who defended the republic and the different groups of people sat on left 
and people who defended the monarchy and the benefit of the church sat on the right (Knapp 
& Wright 2006). The second spectrum: Liberal/Conservative express one’s opinion regarding 
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everyone’s freedom of speech and action respecting the state. Even though recent studies 
already defend that these two spectrums are outdated and don’t reflect the whole reality (Haidt, 
Graham & Joseph 2009), it simply doesn’t exist a measure that has reached the amount of 
consensus that these two groups have reached. Because of that, this study will be focused on 
this two main spectrum of political ideologies: left/right and liberal/conservative. 
A considerable amount of literature has been published regarding the main differences that 
separate left-wing/liberals from right-wing/conservative. Thierry Devos’s paper explained very 
clearly how right-wing parties do trust more in institutions, favor social order and national 
security as well as  try to keep the status quo every time it is possible, whereas left-wing parties, 
do not express the same trust in institutions, and do favor the harmony and equality in a way 
that they can protect the minorities (Devos, Spini  & Schwartz, 2002).A meta-analysis of 
Political Conservatism (Jost, Glaser,  Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003) clearly explains how 
conservative people are less open to experience, do not enjoy uncertainty, have higher 
motivational needs for order and structure as well as a sizeable need for closure. People that are 
more conservative also tend to show a lower self-esteem, are more likely to be moved for 
reasons that include fear, aggression and anger, and are more pessimistic. On the contrary, 
liberals are more optimistic (Sowell, 2007; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009), are more open to 
experience and are more willing to change both personally and politically (McCrae, 1996).  It 
is therefore very clear how liberals and conservatives differ in personality traits (Graham, Haidt 
& Nosek, 2009) which will be reflected in their personal and non-personal decisions. On the 
other hand, personality traits are not the only traits that distinguishes political ideologies. Art 
(Carl, Richards & Heath, 2019), poetry (Gillies & Campbell, 1985) and music (Glasgow, 
Cartier& Wilson,1985) seem also to be part of the numerous traits that differ people with 
different political belief system. 
Nevertheless, it is with this first analysis that we reach the first discussion. It was expected that 
right ideologies could experience a higher rate of overconfidence since they are more confident 
about institutions, however since studies show that it is also expected that conservatives have 
lower self-esteem, we don’t find a direct relation between right-wing parties and 
overconfidence. Nevertheless, conservative people do prefer to keep the same ideas and are less 
adaptable to change, whereas left-wing parties are more willing to change and accept different 
ideas and opinions. A recent study about moral foundations and political ideologies also found 
that liberals score lower levels of Intragroup/loyalty than conservatives (Graham, Haidt & 
Nosek, 2009). Due to this, it is expected that liberals are less confident about their opinions 
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since these are more volatile and therefore, they are less sure regarding the accuracy of one’s 
results/decisions/beliefs. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Right-wing/Conservative people show higher amounts of over-precision than 
left-wing/liberals.  
 
Financial Literacy and Overconfidence 
One part of the literature that further explores overconfidence, also due to the fact that they 
suffer so much from it, are the financial markets. For that reason, one part of this study will be 
reserved for financial literacy, and a good estimator of overconfidence in financial wisdom is 
to analyze both subjective and objective knowledge (Allgood & Walstad, 2016). Whereas 
objective knowledge refers to the real knowledge that one might have about a certain topic, 
measured for example by the number of true answers on one quiz, subjective knowledge is the 
knowledge one might think he/she has about a certain topic,and for that reason sometimes it 
doesn’t reflect the real knowledge (Allgood & Walstad, 2016; Xiao & Porto 2017). The 
literature also claims that subjective knowledge is not an intermediary of objective knowledge 
(Allgood & Walstad, 2016) and that its correlation depends substantially on the personal 
attributes of each person (Agnew & Szykman , 2005). In fact, Park & Lessig (1981) already 
defended that the difference between subjective knowledge and objective knowledge is one’s 
self confidence. And if this self-confidence makes the subjective knowledge higher than the 
objective knowledge then we have reasons to believe that we are facing a situation where the 
individual is demonstrating over-precision.  
Considering our first hypothesis already defends that right-wing/conservative people tend to 
display overconfidence traits more often, it will be argued that subjective knowledge will be 
presented in higher values than objective knowledge in right-wing/conservatives’ people than 
left-wing/liberals, when asked about their financial literacy. This will be in conformity with our 
first hypothesis and will enable us to understand if in fact, right-wing/conservative people tend 
to display more over-estimation both in consumer habits and in financial literacy aspects, as 
both topics will be explored in the survey. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Right-wing/Conservative people show higher amounts of over-estimation than 
Left-wing/Liberals. This can be showed by the fact that in financial literacy questions, Right-
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wing/Conservative people tend to display higher amounts of subjective knowledge than 
objective knowledge, compared with Left-wing/Liberals.   
 
Nonetheless, just because it is hypothesized that right-wing/conservatives display more 
overconfidence in financial literacy as well, it can’t be immediately stated that the remaining 
parties are in fact more conscious about their financial knowledge. Left-wing/Liberal people 
can also be under - confident and for that reason still lack objective knowledge (Moore & Healy, 
2008). Who then displays the most accurate level of confidence that is closer to reality when it 
comes to financial literacy? Very little evidence has been shown about which political 
ideologies have a more distinct knowledge regarding financial literacy. In fact, Montagnoli, 
Moro, Panos & Wright (2016) on their paper “Financial literacy and political orientation in 
Great Britain” state that they are the first to conduct a study like this and that center-right and 
right parties display a slightly higher knowledge of financial literacy than parties from the left 
and center-left.  However due to the fact that this is a study that wasn’t published in a journal 
and that just represents a small sample of the Great Britain’s population, it was decided not to 
focus too much on this paper.  
On the other hand, there have been several studies (Choma, Sumantry & Hanoch, 2019;  Onraet, 
Van Hiel, Dhont, Hodson , Schittekatte & De Pauw, 2015)  that show  how right-
wing/conservative people show a negative association with intellectual capacity as well as 
lower scores in numeracy assignments. Although, based on the small amount of papers found 
and on the serious assumption that it would be made by these papers, it was decided not to come 
up with conclusions about which party/ideology has more knowledge. Instead it will be 
hypothesized: 
 












Why study Overconfidence and Political Ideology 
From the First and Second World War, until the Cold War that proceeded after that, the most 
recent conflicts that changed our history are all marked somehow by political conflicts. It was 
already discussed above how overconfident people tend to get evolved more easily in conflicts 
and wars due to the fact that they overvalue their competencies and undervalue their enemies. 
Overconfident people also tend to make riskier options that might cause financial losses, but 
how do overconfidence biases might get involved with political ideology? 
 The majority of the western society lives today in a Democracy and therefore it is expected 
that the political ideology that is more represent within a country is the one that is going to be 
represent in its parliament.  There have been several studies that try to test the connection 
between overconfidence and age, gender and even political ideologies, published by Ortoleva 
and Snowberg in 2015. This last paper reflects the American Political behavior, which is 
extremely different from the Portuguese/European reality.  In the United States of America 
(USA) the two parties accepted is the Republican and the Democrat Party, and while one is 
more conservative and the other is more liberal, it’s unthinkable to think USA as a country that 
is separated by left-values and right-values as we know them. That’s the reason why political 
ideology differs so much from country to country and there should be a lot of caution when 
comparing ideologies between each country. We will focus on the Portuguese reality, since 
“political opinions and behavior of individuals cannot be explained apart from the environments 
within which they occur” (Robert Huckfeldt, 1986). For that reason, any conclusions that we 
might reach with our study won’t be extended to any other country as it could lead to misleading 
reasonings.  
This paper is written in a time where the new Portuguese parliament was just elected. This 
election was noticeable because of the consistent increase of power of the left-party and the 
decrease of the right-wing representation in the parliament, which is something that is not 
following the European right-parties’ trend. However, three new parties were elected in the 
parliament, one from the left-wing, the other from the right-wing and the third one who call 
themselves “social and economic liberals”. What are going to be the repercussions of this new 
mandate? The future of the country will depend of the decisions made by the elected parliament, 
and that’s why it is so important to analyze the relation between this very recurrent bias and the 






Overconfidence and Decision Making 
We currently, more than ever, live in a world where the amount of data and information seem 
unlimited and every piece of information appears in front of us without permission. Since the 
human brain is not able to process so much information at the same time (Workman, Jones & 
Jochim, 2009; Jones & McGee, 2018), we only focus on some piece of information, 
disregarding the entire group of facts that would serve as the root to make a solid good decision. 
According to Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret (1976), decision making is the process of 
committing to some course of action. This process is complex, and in order to make a perfectly 
rational decision you need to go through a scrutinous analysis of every criteria, weight them, 
rank them and compute an optimal decision (Johns & Saks, 2001; Jones & McGee, 2018). 
However, even though we try to be as rational as possible, it is very easy to be in a position 
where there’s limited time, some uncertainty or even our own self-interest that appears to 
modify our decision-making process. This is called bounded rationality and it was a term 
created by Herbert Simons in 1947 in his book “Administrative Behavior” (Shannon, McGee 
& Jones, 2019) that explain how human judgements might deviate from reality thanks to this 
constant mental shortcut that we make. 
 Decisions form important individual, political, business outcomes and being aware of how to 
improve the quality of these outcomes would be extremely beneficial for the overall society 
(Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman, 2009). In order to do this, it is crucial to pay attention to the 
numerous biases that might affect one’s reasoning. Decision making has been studied by several 
different fields including management, marketing and psychology (Harrington & Ottenbacher, 
2009), and it’s important to enhance how costly it can be in the long term to make a wrong 
decision (Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman, 2009). 
Politics is about deciding the best course for each country, and the political ideology of each 
one reflects not only the personal opinion of economic and social matters, as well as the way 
we might make decisions in our daily life. Since political ideology reflects part of the human 
being, its ideologies and its personality (Sidanius,1985), we can optimistically assume that the 
way we make decisions in our daily life is at least slightly biased by our political ideologies. It 
is therefore extremely important to realize which spectrum commits more often the mother of 






Methodology and Data 
 
Participants were 619 adults and 2 teenagers (less than 18 years old) that still remain totally 
eligible for this study. The proportion of female representatives was 61% against 39% males 
and all participants engaged in the study by an online Qualtrics survey [Appendix A] that was 
shared on several different platforms, to make sure that all participants were randomly assigned 
to this study.  
The online survey consisted on 27 multiple choice questions and because of the size of the 
survey and the fact that the results were solely dependent on the good will of everyone, there 
were a lot of participants that gave up answering in the middle of the questionnaire. These 
people were eventually removed from our original sample.  
Firstly, we asked the participants to self-classify themselves regarding their political ideologies 
on a 10-point scale that was anchored by “extremely left-wing/extremely right wing” in one 
question and “extremely liberal/extremely conservative” in another. This 10-point scale have 
been already defended by Castles, Mair & Pedersen (1997). The self-evaluation was conducted 
since it is very common for people to identify themselves with a certain political ideology while 
not behaving very accordingly to it, meaning that people usually are not very good in estimating 
their own political ideologies (Zell & Bernstein, 2014).It was asked for members of extreme 
left/extreme right parties to fill in the survey, as well as share with colleagues from the same 
party. This was done because it is believed that more extreme results might lead us to a more 
concrete outcome.  
The following 6 questions were taken from Feldman & Johnston (2014) paper that used the 
following topics “Government Spending; Guaranteed Jobs; Assistance to the Poor; Abortion; 
Gay Adoption and Women’s Role” as core issue questions to understand the determinants of 
political ideology. It wasn’t included the “Medical Insurance” topic that was also included in 
this group due to the fact that the Portuguese reality doesn’t reflect the same conflict about 
medical insurance as the population from to United States does (Rosenthal, 2018). These 
questions were to verify if in fact the ideologies were well identified by the participants, which 
usually doesn’t occur and eventually use this new political ideology information, as the true, 
real ideology of each individual.  
After these set of questions, three opinion questions were asked, where the inquiries were 
supposed to choose among four options. The opinion questions were about a cleaning product, 
a car and a trip. These three topics were chosen because one (cleaning product) was a product 
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with low involvement, the other was a product of high involvement (car) and for that reason 
had a lot of information available and necessary to make a good decision and the third product 
was a free trip. This third option was chosen to be a benchmark of the remaining options since 
it was a free service and would only rely on personal opinion. For that reason, it was expected 
that the majority of the participants would be very confident while deciding this last option, 
more confident than the other two options.  
After every choice was made it was asked how much confident the participant was that he/she 
had made the right choice. This set of questions were supposed to calculate the level of 
overconfidence of every individual on a consumer level, specially the level of over-precision 
(Hypothesis 1).  
In the end, three questions of financial literacy were asked to the participants. The three 
questions were taken from Lusardi & Tufano’s paper (2015), “testing knowledge of 
fundamental concepts related to debt and by a measure of self-assessed financial knowledge”.  
In the end of every financial question it was asked how confident the participant was that he/she 
got the answer right, calculating the subjective and objective knowledge at the same time 
(relevant for Hypothesis 2 and 3). 
With the total of 27 questions it is expected to: be able to see the different political ideologies 
that people identify themselves too, test overconfidence in simple and complex purchasing 
behaviors as well as test overconfidence in financial knowledge.  
SPSS program is going to be used to study all the relations between the variables. 
 
Results  
Despite our considerable sample, there were 15 people that didn’t identify themselves on the 
Left/Right spectrum and 7 people that didn’t identify themselves on the Liberal/Conservative 
spectrum, probably by mistake, as this was the first question of the survey, and was the only 
one that wasn’t answered.  Regardless of the effort to talk with extreme Left /extreme Right 
parties, and invite them to fulfil the survey, the survey population is still very centrist, being 5 
the most common value shown in the survey, in a spectrum composed of values from 0 to 10. 
Indeed, the mean in Left/Right spectrum of 5,17, decreasing slightly in the Liberal/Conservative 
spectrum (4,59) [Table 1]. This means that, on average, people are more willing to consider 
themselves more right-wing than more conservatives, probably due to the word itself that might 
have a negative connotation to some.  Another reason that might also explain this slight change 
is the possibility of a participant consider himself/herself as someone with economical 
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ideologies that resemble the left parties, however having social ideologies that are more 
conservative, and for that reason vote differently in the different questions that were proposed.  
The correlation between Left/Right (variable L_R) and Liberal/Conservative (variable L_C) is 
0,434, meaning a low positive correlation (Mukaka, 2012), with a significant p-value< 0,05.  
This means that people who consider themselves to belong to a left party also consider 
themselves as a more liberal individual, and people that vote more often on right parties identify 
themselves as more conservative individuals.  However, it was expected that this correlation 
would take a higher value. Again, this might be explained to the fact that people might see Left-
Right and Liberal-Conservative spectrum differently even though they have the same values 
(0-10). It could be possible to only use one of these variables for this study, however it wouldn’t 
represent the whole reality and it would be risky as valuable insight could be lost.  In order to 
see if these results were reliable, the Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated and was equal to 0,605 
[Table 2], which is not very high but still enough to confirm the reliability of the variables L_R 
and L_C. 
As it was explained before, some questions were asked to the participants regarding economic 
and social issues with the purpose of seeing if in fact people actually are who they believe they 
are, while discussing political ideologies. There were 3 questions regarding the state 
intervention and economic issues and 3 questions about social matters. In order to calculate the 
true economic and social ideology of each participant, two new variables were created: 
Mean_eco_ideo and Mean_soc_ideo. Their correlation is low (0,181) and the variable is not 
significant at p-value =0,05 [Table 3], meaning that even though some Conservative/Liberal 
people have the same political ideology for economic and social matters, there’s still a lot of 
participants that weren’t as coherent, which is not surprising, but still relevant.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha of these new variables and L_R, L_C also decreased (0,594) [Table 4], which means that 








When calculated the correlation between the variables L_R, L_C, Mean_eco_ideo and 
Mean_soc_ideo the correlations still present low values even though all of them are positive. 
 
For that reason, we tried to calculate the average of the 6 questions, and we named it 
Mean_both_ideo. Since the set of 6 questions were combined by three questions of social matter 
and three questions of economical matter it was assumed that the total mean of economic and 
social ideologies would summarize the real ideology of each individual being 10 someone who 
is extremely conservative and supportive of right wing parties and being 0 someone who is 
extremely liberal and supportive of left-wing parties. 
The correlation between this new variable and L_R is = 0,369 and with L_C_=0,357, being both 
valuables significant at 95% confidence level. The Cronbach’s alpha also increased its value 
when calculating the reliability between the 3 variables increasing to 0,652 [Table5]. Therefore, 
there are already some reasons to believe that this new variable is going to be quite useful in 
the research.  
It was also created another variable, that is the mean of both variables together L_R and L_C, 
having the name Mean_LR_LC. If we calculate the correlation between this new variable and 
Mean_both_ideo, it will still give a low positive result (0,425, significant at p-value <0,01) 












Ext Left=0; Ext 
Right=10 
Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 606    
Ext Lib=0; Ext 
Cons=10 
Pearson Correlation ,434** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000    
N 604 614   
Mean_soc_ideo Pearson Correlation ,244** ,345** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   
N 604 612 616  
Mean_eco_ideo Pearson Correlation ,334** ,192** ,181** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000  
N 604 612 616 616 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




Bernstein (2014):  even though people see themselves as having a certain political ideology, 
sometimes, their beliefs and ideologies don’t reflect the same reality.    
In the first hypothesis it is defended that “Right-wing/Conservative people show higher 
amounts of over-precision than left-wing/liberals”.  For that reason, it is going to be necessary 
to correlate the ideologies of each individual with the confidence that each one demonstrated 
in every question. Since the only variable that truly demonstrates the political ideology of each 
individual is mean_both_ideo, we’re going to exclude the variable mean_LR_LC for the 
following hypothesis, as this last one doesn’t reflect the reality. For that reason, the analysis 
that is going to be important is the correlation between every individual’s over-precision with 
Mean_both_ideo.  
We can see the general level of over-precision by calculating the overall level of confidence 
showed in the questionnaire independently of the type of questions, or by separating the two 
types of confidence that were tested: the ones regarding basic questions of decision making 
(mean_conf_dm) and the ones regarding financial literacy. This last one is the general level of 
overconfidence and because of that will have the name S_Fin_Know - Subjective Financial 
Knowledge, that is going to be useful for the study of our second hypothesis. Since there are 
three questions of each group, it makes sense that the correlation happens by calculating the 
mean of the sample of overconfidence for decision making and financial literacy 
(Mean_total_conf). 
  As we can see, the hypothesis is not verified: the correlaton between Mean_both_ideo and 
Mean_total_conf, S_Fin_Know   and Mean_conf_fin are respectively 0,054;  -0,022  and 0,085,  














Consequently, we can conclude that there’s no strong positive correlation between political 
conservatism /right wing and over-precision since all the correlations are close to zero. In fact, 
if the confidence of every question is evaluated individually [table 7], we can even see some 
negative low correlations (meaning more over-precision for liberals/left-wing people) such as 
the choice of the car (-0,014) and the choice of the trip (-0,039), however, these correlations are 
not significant.  
Regarding the questions of financial literacy, the first question is the only one that presents, at 
a significant level at p<0,01, a low positive correlation of 0,117. However, the value will 
decrease in every question, and in the final (3rd) question the correlation between confidence 
and political ideology actually shows a negative value (-0,002). Nevertheless, it’s not possible 
to confirm the first hypothesis given the presented results, since only the first question of 
financial literacy (conf_FIN1) presents a significant value.  
In fact, every part of the ideology spectrum showed somehow some level of over-precision 
(maximum levels of confidence for every type of question, decision making or financial 
questions). We can also verify that it’s after the level 6,67 of conservatism that the low levels 
of confidence disappear, giving space to higher, solid levels of over-precision. Nevertheless, 
since the sample that is after the level 6,67 only represents 1,3% of the population [Table 8], it 









Mean_total_conf Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 616    
S_Fin_Know Pearson Correlation ,888** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000    
N 616 621   
Mean_conf_dm Pearson Correlation ,690** ,281** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   
N 616 616 616  
Mean_both_ideo Pearson Correlation ,054 ,085* -,022 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,184 ,034 ,580  
N 616 616 616 616 
**.  The correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed). 
*. The correlation is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed). 




In order to test the second hypothesis, that states that right-wing/conservative people display 
higher amounts of subjective knowledge than objective knowledge (over-estimation), 
compared to left-wing/Liberals, the variable S_Fin_Know is going to be used once again, as 
well as Mean_both_ideo. In this hypothesis, the questions of decision making are left out, since 
they are simply questioning of opinion, and there’s no right or wrong answer. Another two 
variables were created: O_Fin_KnowTotal and SK_bigger_OK.The first one gives the number 
of how many correct financial answers each individual got right (being max:3 and min:0), 
whereas SK_bigger_OK works as a dummy variable to see if the individual showed a higher 
subjective knowledge than the truth, objective knowledge: if Subjective Knowledge > 
Objective Knowledge, the variable returns the value 1, if the opposite happens, or if Subjective 
Knowledge=Objective Knowledge,  SK_bigger_OK=0. If the hypothesis is verified, the 
correlation between SK_bigger_OK and Mean_both_ideo is going to be high, as it will reflect 
that the higher the value of conservatism, the higher the chances SK_bigger_OK=1. 
However, the correlation value was -0,022 and not significant p<0,05 [Table 9]. In fact, in 621 
samples, only 13 individuals got an objective knowledge equal or superior than the subjective 
knowledge (SK_bigger_OK=0). And since we have a bigger sample of left-wing individuals, 
[Table 8] where 83% of the population are located on the left of the centre(5) of the spectrum, 
it’s normal that it even seems that the higher amounts of subjective knowledge is attributed to 
more liberal individuals.  
Since Subjective Knowledge in this test reflects the level of confidence that each individual 
demonstrates regarding the financial questions (if they got them right or not), this is a variable 
that should be studied more in depth. Even thought it was already proved that Mean_both_ideo 
and SK_bigger_OK are not correlated, it is necessary to verify which variables are in fact 
responsible for the creation of this big level of overconfidence that was represented in this 
sample. For that analysis we’re going to use a multiple regression model. The model: Subjective 
Knowledge= Objective Knowledge + Mean_both_ideo had an R2 of 0,118, meaning that 11,8% 









Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,343a ,118 ,115 ,61624 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,695 ,058  46,339 ,000 
O_Fin_KnowTo
tal 
,256 ,029 ,333 8,751 ,000 
Mean_both_ide
o 
,022 ,015 ,055 1,436 ,152 
a. Dependent Variable: S_Fin_Know 
Figure 3(source: Survey Data) 
With this model we can see that if subjective knowledge increases in one unit, the 
Mean_both_ideo will increase 0,022, Ceteris Paribus (c.p.), which means that, the higher the 
subjective knowledge, the more conservative an individual might be. However, the correlation 
still presents a value very close to zero and the p-value=0,152 which risks the significance of 
our model.  
Variables like age, gender and income were also included in another model, to see if the model 
would become a better estimate, however the R2 value hardly increased (0,165) and only age 
and gender were significant variables, as well as O_Fin_KnowTotal.  
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,406a ,165 ,158 ,60486 









Figure 4(source: Survey Data) 
In fact, with this model, Mean_both_ideo become even less significant, and its coefficient 
became smaller.  
The next step would be to create interactions between these variables because it can grow 
comprehension of the connections among the variables in the model and enables more theories 
to be tried. It was created interactions between Mean_both_ideo and age, income and gender. 
However, only one interaction appeared to be relevant, which was the coefficient of the variable 
ideo_times_age (mean_both_ideo*age) [Table 10] that represented a negative number: when 
subjective knowledge increases one unit, this new variable decreases 0,024, meaning that older 
conservative people actually showed less confidence than the general conservative/older  
individual. It was relevant therefore to study more in depth this relation between subjective 
knowledge and political ideology, taking age as a relevant factor. To do this, the variable age 
was splitted in two ways: individuals whose age was below the median, and individuals whose 
age was above the median. According to the table of frequencies [Table 11], the group that has 
the value located in the 50% of the sample is group number 5 (45-55). However, since group 4 
(35-45) represents 49,4% of the sample, it was determined to consider the median value as 
group 4 instead of group 5. The first cluster included the age groups <18, 18-25, 25-35 and 35-
45, whereas the second cluster included the age group 45-55 and >55. 
 By looking to the two graphs bellow, it can be verified that younger individuals from the first 
cluster do show a lower subjective knowledge of financial literacy than older individuals. This 









t Sig. B Std Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,220 ,109  20,286 ,000 
Mean_both_ideo ,004 ,016 ,011 ,273 ,785 
O_Fin_KnowTotal ,229 ,030 ,295 7,563 ,000 
Gender ,229 ,053 ,170 4,302 ,000 
Age ,043 ,018 ,092 2,438 ,015 
Income ,012 ,012 ,040 1,033 ,302 
a. Dependent Variable: S_Fin_Know 
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a higher objective knowledge of financial literacy than younger individuals (<45 years old) 
[Table 12]. 
The lower values of subjective knowledge were displayed by centrists’ younger individuals 
(mean_both_ideo close to 5) so, once again, the higher values of subjective knowledge are 
displayed very frequently all over the spectrum, independently from the age of the individual.  
In fact, graphically it’s even tricky to understand the -0,024 coefficient of the variable 
ideo_times_age (mean_both_ideo*age). This might be explained because the number of 
individuals presented in every bar is not clear. Because our sample is composed by 621 
individuals, and the options of subjective knowledge presented were quite low, all the possible 
representations lack some accuracy regarding the density of each bar. 
 
 
Bar chart of individuals >=45 years old 
 

















Bar chart of individuals <45 years old 
 
Figure 6 (Source: Survey Data) 
 
Finally, our third and last hypothesis “There won’t be a distinctive correlation between political 
ideology and objective knowledge” was confirmed by calculating the correlation between 
variables O_Fin_KnowTotal and Mean_both_ideo. The correlation value [Table 13] is very 
close to zero (0,092) with a p-value<0,05, which concludes that in this population, there’s no 
evidence that participants that are more sympathetic with liberal/conservative ideas show a 




Figure 7(source: Survey Data) 
 
One interesting fact was that both ends of the spectrum got all of the three questions of financial 
literacy correct (Objective Knowledge=3), something that was accomplished only 4,3% of the 
time. Still and once again, those were also some similar episodes in the centrum that didn’t 
allow a direct relation between extremism and objective knowledge. 48,3% of the total sample 
didn’t have a single correct answer, 33,2% got 1 correct answer and 14,2% got 2 right answers. 
[Table 14]  
 In fact, some recent studies showed that lower general insight in adolescence predicts more 
greater prejudice in adulthood, and this impact was to a great extent intervened via conservative 
ideology (Hodson & Busseri, 2012). Nevertheless, it is still very risky to even hypothesize that 
some extreme point of the spectrum displays a higher objective knowledge of a certain matter 
or even higher cognitive abilities due to the lack of available information and small sample size. 
 
Supplementary Analysis: Extremism, the new variable 
Because there has been some difficulty in making the political ideology variable a significant 
variable in some cases, a new experience was conducted and a new variable created, where it 
was considered that the relation between political ideologies and subjective knowledge might 
not be linear, but instead be a parabola. With this comes the idea that it’s not only the 
participants from extreme right that display higher values of overconfidence, but also 
participants from extreme left. This idea was already defended and proved by Ortoleva & 
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Snowberg (2015), stating that overconfidence and extremism are correlated, being the study 
statistically significant. This paper also mentioned that “the covariance between extremism and 
overconfidence is greater for those right-of-center than left-of-center” (page 21). This study 
wasn’t mentioned before, as it reflects the American reality and not the Portuguese one, and 
that reality has been avoided through this study. Nevertheless, since their results are significant 
and cohese throughout the study, it was decided to test this new option and adapt it to the 
Portuguese reality, in order to see the results. For that reason, a new variable was created, 
Extremism, that reflects the distance to the center, being 5 the participants that voted in an 
extreme number (0 or 10) and 0 the participants that voted in the center. The value extremism 
was constructed from the variable Mean_both_ideo to express the veracity of one’s political 
ideology.  
When trying to test again H1 to see the new correlation between this new variable and 
Mean_Total_conf,Mean_total_conf  and even  S_Fin_Know [table 15], the result is, again, not 
very promising: the results are still not significant at p-value=0,05 and even though the value 
continues quite low, close to zero, the variable of total financial knowledge presents a  negative 
value (-0,033), meaning that  when the level of extremism increases, the level over- precision 
actually decreases. The lack of significance is constant in the study of the correlation of this 
new variable, however, while studying every question in detail the only significant correlation 
is once again the one between Extremism and the first question of financial literacy, having a  
negative result of 0,102: when the level of extremism increases, the level of financial confidence 
actually decreased on that question.  
Again, it was necessary to test the Regression Model using interactions, in order to verify that 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,422a ,178 ,165 ,60209 
a. Predictors: (Constant), income extr_times_age, Gender, 







Figure 8(source: Survey Data) 
Again, the variables that are significant and should be taken into consideration are 
extr_times_age (extremism*age), extr_times_gender (extr*gender). However, by looking into 
the representation bellow, it’s easy to realize that extremists show constantly higher values of 
confidence, which is not showed as consistently in the least extremism individuals. Once again, 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,637 ,201  13,150 ,000 
O_Fin_KnowTotal ,263 ,055 ,338 4,782 ,000 
extr_times_ok -,014 ,022 -,050 -,668 ,505 
extr_times_income -,008 ,008 -,100 -1,037 ,300 
extr_times_age ,026 ,012 ,274 2,094 ,037 
extr_times_gender ,080 ,037 ,260 2,151 ,032 
Extremism -,176 ,073 -,388 -2,403 ,017 
Age  -,016 ,033 -,035 -,498 ,618 
Gender ,050 ,097 ,037 ,516 ,606 
Income ,033 ,021 ,108 1,546 ,123 






The correlation between over-precision (mean_total_conf) and political ideologies 
(mean_both_ideo) shows a very weak, not significant correlation (0,054).  
In fact, the level of confidence only becomes significant if we analyze the level of confidence 
regarding financial literacy, even though it still gives a value very close to zero (0,085). Despite 
the lack of correlation, it was clear with figure 3 that the sample that represented Right-
wing/conservative individuals showed itself more cohesive, higher values of over-precision. 
Nevertheless, since the sample of Right-wing individuals is very small, and the Left-wing 
individuals’ result showed a big variance, it compromised the results and therefore the 
hypothesis that was being tested.  
The second hypothesis that tested the effect of over-estimation in political ideology also gave 
a correlation that wasn’t significant.  Once again, the results that were expected to happen only 
in the Right-wing/conservative side, did happen in all the spectrum: it was possible to verify 
situations where the Subjective Knowledge was higher than the Objective Knowledge in every 
part of the spectrum. In fact, only 2% of the total population didn’t show this behavior. Despite 
the efforts to have numerous participants of extreme Right/extreme Left parties, our sample 
was specially centrists, which in fact reflects the Portuguese reality.  
When calculating our reliable political ideology variable (mean_both_ideo), we soon realize 
that it’s minimum value is 0,00 (extreme-left/Liberal), however it’s maximum is only 8,67 
[table 8].The proportion of liberals was also much larger than conservatives, as 83% of the 




10(source: Survey Data) 
 
In reality, as we can see with the graph above that is part of the study of our second hypothesis, 
the maximum level of subjective knowledge (individuals were sure that they got every financial 
question right) is displayed only by individuals who are between 0,83-8,67 in our ideology 
spectrum, which shows a higher level of confidence displayed by extreme-left/centrum 
individuals than extreme-right/centrum individuals. However, it is still quite surprising the level 
of over-estimation and over-precision showed in this study by all members of the entire political 
ideology spectrum, given the number of correct answers. It was common to see high levels of 
overconfidence in centrists (values around the number 5), and because that population was 
much larger than the extremes, it eventually obfuscated the overconfidence of conservative 
individuals. However, if we had found more extreme-Right/conservative people, perhaps the 
correlation values could still have changed. 
When trying to estimate how Subjective Knowledge behaves, one could verify that as the 
individual gets older and more conservative, the subjective knowledge actually decreases. Older 
individuals (>=45) also display higher amounts of subjective and objective knowledge than 
younger (<45) individuals. In fact, only 13 individuals, out of 621, were modest enough to have 
an objective knowledge higher or equal to their subjective knowledge.  
It was also possible to verify that the level of extremism is not correlated with the level of 
overconfidence, as it was verified in previous papers. In reality, every time the subjective 
knowledge increases one unit, the level of extremism reduces 0,176 (p-value<0,05), showing 
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that the proportion of individuals that identify themselves as centrists, showed more over-
estimation than extremists.  
Only the third hypothesis formulated in this study was confirmed immediately, with 95% 
confidence interval, proving that it’s not possible to correlate objective financial knowledge 
with political ideology. In fact, different groups of the spectrum showed different levels of 
knowledge, an only 4% of the total sample got the three questions right.  
Despite the rejection of our first two hypothesis, the results are still quite interesting.  
It was also interesting to realize that, despite our small sample, our population reflected the 
Portuguese reality: Portugal is a country that is mainly centrist when it comes to have a certain 
political ideology – PS: Partido Socialista  and PSD: Partido Social Democrata are still the two 
biggest political forces in the country, being both centrists, one center-left and the other center-
right. ) Our sample was mainly centrist and that revealed that centrists are in fact even more 
overconfident than extremists (left and right).  
This study was important to verify that political ideologies might not be the best estimator to 
test overconfidence, and that itself, is already a very valuable insight. It was already stated 
several times before how overconfidence is one of the biggest and pervasive bias, amongst the 
other, numerous biases to which human judgment is vulnerable. And according to this paper, 
this pervasiveness can’t be controlled by only looking at each one’s political ideologies.  
In fact, one can consider that this paper suffered from overconfidence from the author itself: in 
order to facilitate this work, a lot of focus was put into the small number of papers available in 
this topic, often ignoring other possibilities.  Sometimes, individuals depend too intensely on 
that experiential information without seeing completely how their encounters fit into different 
patterns. Individuals regularly neglect to represent the way that they streamline their points of 
view and misrepresent their reactions. 
Some good alternatives to avoid falling in the trap of overconfidence is to continuously 
attempt to produce different alternatives (Haran, Moore & Morewedge, 2010), as well as 
request criticism from trusted sources. Sometimes doubting about yourself might be the best 







 Future implications and Recommendations  
 
Overconfidence and conservatism have been already linked in Ortoleva & Snowberg’s work, 
although, we weren’t able to confirm that in our study. It might be because the American reality 
is very different than the Portuguese but, in the future, one suggestion would be to control the 
sample size of each ideology more rigorously. Even though extreme-Right/Left ideology parties 
were contacted for this survey, the proportion of Left party individuals was much higher than 
Right party ones, which could be one of the main factors that decreased the significance of 
several tests done in this study.  As it was mentioned before, 83% of the total sample had an 
ideology value bellow 5 (spectrum from 0-10, being 0 extreme left/liberal, and 10 extreme 
right/conservative). 
Another suggestion for future research would be to find better, more valuable estimators. In 
Regression models made in this study, the biggest R2, meaning the extent of the variance for a 
dependent variable that's clarified by an independent variable or variables, in a regression model 
was only 0,178, which is considered a quite good, reliable value in social sciences. However, 
apart from political ideology, only age, income and gender worked as estimators that would 
change the overconfidence of one’s individual. Variables such as years of education, location 
(if lives in a suburban or rural area) and even if participants belong actively or not to a political 
party, are just some suggestions to be taken into consideration as well in future research.  
Another option for the inexistence of correlation was the lack of incentive to respond correctly 
and honestly of every question. The Survey was composed by 27 questions and the fact that the 
survey’s answers were merely dependent on the individual’s good will to finish it without 
supervision could compromise the quality of our study. It is impossible to conclude if the survey 
was done with full attention and honesty. In fact, some feedback regarding our questionnaire 
was that “it was too long and dense”, and even though the financial questions were used to test 
basic financial knowledge, almost half of the entire population didn’t get a single answer 
correctly. Questions regarding decision making were also too simple. Even though it was tried 
to overwhelm the participant with information, especially in the car question, in order to 
increase the seriousness of the decision, there were still a lot of individuals that were very 
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Ext Left=0; Ext Right=10 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 = extremely left-wing 4 ,6 ,7 ,7 
1 7 1,1 1,2 1,8 
2 17 2,7 2,8 4,6 
3 58 9,3 9,6 14,2 
4 113 18,2 18,6 32,8 
5 178 28,7 29,4 62,2 
6 94 15,1 15,5 77,7 
7 88 14,2 14,5 92,2 
8 35 5,6 5,8 98,0 
9 7 1,1 1,2 99,2 
10 = extremely right-wing 5 ,8 ,8 100,0 
Total 606 97,6 100,0  
Missing System 15 2,4   





Ext Left=0; Ext 
Right=10 
Ext Lib=0; Ext 
Cons=10 
N Valid 606 614 
Missing 15 7 
Mean 5,17 4,59 
Median 5,00 5,00 
Mode 5 5 
Percentiles 25 4,00 3,75 
50 5,00 5,00 










Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
,605 ,605 2 
 
 




 Mean_soc_ideo Mean_eco_ideo 
Mean_soc_ideo 1,000  








Ext Lib=0; Ext Cons=10 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 = extremely liberal 9 1,4 1,5 1,5 
1 7 1,1 1,1 2,6 
2 33 5,3 5,4 8,0 
3 104 16,7 16,9 24,9 
4 114 18,4 18,6 43,5 
5 210 33,8 34,2 77,7 
6 69 11,1 11,2 88,9 
7 47 7,6 7,7 96,6 
8 11 1,8 1,8 98,4 
9 5 ,8 ,8 99,2 
10 = extremely conservative 5 ,8 ,8 100,0 
Total 614 98,9 100,0  
Missing System 7 1,1   
Total 621 100,0   
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• [Table 5 - correlation and Cronbach’s alpha between variables Mean_both_ideo, 




Ext Left=0; Ext 
Right=10 
Ext Lib=0; Ext 
Cons=10 Mean_both_ideo 
Ext Left=0; Ext Right=10 Pearson  Correlation 1   
Sig. (2-tailed)    
N 606   
Ext Lib=0; Ext Cons=10 Pearson  Correlation ,434** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000   
N 604 614  
Mean_both_ideo Pearson  Correlation ,369** ,357** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000  
N 604 612 616 












Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 






















 Mean_LR_LC Mean_both_ideo 
Mean_LR_LC Pearson Correlation 1  
Sig. (2-tailed)   
N 604  
Mean_both_ideo Pearson Correlation ,425** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 602 616 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
• [Table 7 - Correlations between Mean_both_ideo and CONF_FIN1, CONF_FIN2, 







Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of items 
,591 ,597 2 
Correlations 
 CONF_FIN1 CONF_FIN2 CONF_FIN3 
Mean_both_i
deo 
CONF_FIN1 Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 621    
CONF_FIN2 Pearson Correlation ,604** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000    
N 621 621   
CONF_FIN3 Pearson Correlation ,401** ,433** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   
N 621 621 621  
Mean_both_ideo Pearson Correlation ,117** ,076 -,002 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,004 ,059 ,957  
N 616 616 616 616 
**.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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• [Table 8 – Table of frequencies of variable Mean_both_ideo] 
 
Mean_both_ideo 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ,00 7 1,1 1,1 1,1 
,33 8 1,3 1,3 2,4 
,50 9 1,4 1,5 3,9 
,67 8 1,3 1,3 5,2 
,83 17 2,7 2,8 8,0 
1,00 5 ,8 ,8 8,8 
1,17 13 2,1 2,1 10,9 
1,33 13 2,1 2,1 13,0 
1,50 17 2,7 2,8 15,7 
1,67 25 4,0 4,1 19,8 
1,83 20 3,2 3,2 23,1 
2,00 19 3,1 3,1 26,1 
2,17 19 3,1 3,1 29,2 
2,33 19 3,1 3,1 32,3 
2,50 25 4,0 4,1 36,4 
2,67 16 2,6 2,6 39,0 
2,83 21 3,4 3,4 42,4 
Correlations 
 
 CONF_DET CONF_CAR CONF_TRIP 
Mean_both_id
eo 
CONF_DET Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 616    
CONF_CAR Pearson Correlation ,294** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000    
N 616 616   
CONF_TRIP Pearson Correlation ,219** ,246** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   
N 616 616 621  
Mean_both_ideo Pearson Correlation ,005 -,014 -,039 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,892 ,726 ,334  
N 616 616 616 616 




3,00 19 3,1 3,1 45,5 
3,17 18 2,9 2,9 48,4 
3,33 30 4,8 4,9 53,2 
3,50 20 3,2 3,2 56,5 
3,67 23 3,7 3,7 60,2 
3,83 20 3,2 3,2 63,5 
4,00 23 3,7 3,7 67,2 
4,17 27 4,3 4,4 71,6 
4,20 1 ,2 ,2 71,8 
4,33 16 2,6 2,6 74,4 
4,50 18 2,9 2,9 77,3 
4,67 24 3,9 3,9 81,2 
4,83 11 1,8 1,8 83,0 
5,00 11 1,8 1,8 84,7 
5,17 8 1,3 1,3 86,0 
5,33 13 2,1 2,1 88,1 
5,50 13 2,1 2,1 90,3 
5,67 12 1,9 1,9 92,2 
5,83 12 1,9 1,9 94,2 
6,00 2 ,3 ,3 94,5 
6,17 5 ,8 ,8 95,3 
6,33 6 1,0 1,0 96,3 
6,50 7 1,1 1,1 97,4 
6,67 7 1,1 1,1 98,5 
6,83 1 ,2 ,2 98,7 
7,00 1 ,2 ,2 98,9 
7,17 1 ,2 ,2 99,0 
7,50 1 ,2 ,2 99,2 
7,67 1 ,2 ,2 99,4 
8,00 3 ,5 ,5 99,8 
8,67 1 ,2 ,2 100,0 
Total 616 99,2 100,0  
Missing System 5 ,8   









• [Table 9 – Study regarding SK_bigger_OK: Correlations between Mean_both_ideo; 
table of frequencies and graph] 
Correlations 
 
 Mean_both_ideo SK_bigger_OK 
Mean_both_ideo Pearson Correlation 1  
Sig. (2-tailed)   
N 616  
SK_bigger_OK Pearson Correlation -,022 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,593  
N 616 621 
 
SK_bigger_OK 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 13 2,1 2,1 2,1 
1 608 97,9 97,9 100,0 

























• [Table 10 – Regression model of variables ideo_times_age, O_Fin_KnowTotal, 
Income, Gender, Age, ideo_times_income, ideo_times_gender, Mean_both_ideo] 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,421a ,178 ,167 ,60163 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ideo_times_age, O_Fin_KnowTotal, Income, 










t Sig. B Std Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,778 ,233  7,645 ,000 
Mean_both_ideo ,137 ,063 ,343 2,165 ,031 
O_Fin_KnowTotal ,213 ,070 ,273 3,053 ,002 
ideo_times_OK ,004 ,018 ,021 ,213 ,832 
ideo_times_income ,008 ,007 ,146 1,192 ,234 
ideo_times_age -,024 ,011 -,326 -2,248 ,025 
ideo_times_gender -,051 ,032 -,249 -1,574 ,116 
Age ,123 ,040 ,261 3,107 ,002 
Gender ,402 ,123 ,297 3,260 ,001 
Income -,015 ,026 -,048 -,564 ,573 














• [Table 11 – Frequency Statistics of variable age] 
 
Statistics 
Age   










 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <18 2 ,3 ,3 ,3 
18-25 114 18,4 18,4 18,7 
25-35 69 11,1 11,1 29,8 
35-45 122 19,6 19,6 49,4 
45-55 181 29,1 29,1 78,6 
>55 133 21,4 21,4 100,0 
Total 621 100,0 100,0  
 
• [Table 12 – Graph of variables O_Fin_KnowTotal and Mean_both_ideo] 
 




Individuals (>=45 years old) 
 
 



















 Mean_both_ideo O_Fin_KnowTotal 
Mean_both_ideo Pearson Correlation 1  
Sig. (2-tailed)   
N 616  
O_Fin_KnowTotal Pearson Correlation ,092* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,023  
N 616 621 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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• [Table 14 – Table of frequencies of variable O_Fin_KnowTotal] 
O_Fin_KnowTotal 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 300 48,3 48,3 48,3 
1 206 33,2 33,2 81,5 
2 88 14,2 14,2 95,7 
3 27 4,3 4,3 100,0 




• [Table 15 - analysis extremism- correlation with Mean_Total_conf, S_Fin_Know,  









 Extremism CONF_DET CONF_CAR CONF_TRIP 
Extremism Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 616    
CONF_DET Pearson Correlation ,006 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,884    
N 616 616   
CONF_CAR Pearson Correlation ,030 ,294** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,462 ,000   
N 616 616 616  
CONF_TRIP Pearson Correlation ,077 ,219** ,246** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,057 ,000 ,000  
N 616 616 616 621 
**.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlations 
 
 Extremism CONF_FIN1 CONF_FIN2 CONF_FIN3 
Extremism Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 616    
CONF_FIN1 Pearson Correlation -,102* 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,012    
N 616 621   
CONF_FIN2 Pearson Correlation -,070 ,604** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,083 ,000   
N 616 621 621  
CONF_FIN3 Pearson Correlation -,003 ,401** ,433** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,942 ,000 ,000  
N 616 621 621 621 
*.  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 








Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,406a ,165 ,158 ,60488 








nf S_Fin_Know Extremism 
Mean_conf_dm Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 616    
Mean_total_conf Pearson Correlation ,690** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000    
N 616 616   
S_Fin_Know Pearson Correlation ,281** ,888** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   
N 616 616 621  
Extremism Pearson Correlation ,053 -,033 -,077 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,192 ,412 ,055  
N 616 616 616 616 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,240 ,121  18,443 ,000 
O_Fin_KnowTotal ,229 ,030 ,295 7,574 ,000 
Extremism -,004 ,017 -,008 -,204 ,838 
Age ,044 ,018 ,093 2,443 ,015 
Gender ,229 ,053 ,170 4,311 ,000 
Income ,012 ,012 ,041 1,051 ,294 





• [Appendix A -  Qualtrics’ Survey] 
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